Some values for constant-sum and bilateral cooperative games
Tom 34 / 2007
Applicationes Mathematicae 34 (2007), 359-371
MSC: Primary 91A12.
DOI: 10.4064/am34-3-7
Streszczenie
We prove new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, defined on the class of nonnegative constant-sum games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition as well as on nonnegative bilateral games with nonzero worth of the grand coalition. A characteristic feature of the latter class of cooperative games is that for such a game any coalition and its complement in the set of all players have the same worth. The axiomatizations are then generalized to the entire class of constant-sum or bilateral games, respectively. Moreover, a new axiomatization of the Deegan–Packel value on the set of all cooperative games is presented and possibilities of creation of its version in those special cases are discussed.
